Quantum Computing Could Unlock Lost Bitcoin — Analysts Say

An on‑chain analyst argues that the looming arrival of powerful quantum computers may trigger one of the most disruptive moments in Bitcoin’s history. Not because quantum hardware is suddenly able to break Bitcoin’s cryptography today, but because of how the network might respond (or fail to respond) to the threat.

Threat #1: Dormant Bitcoin supply at risk

A key point in the article is that a large portion of Bitcoin’s supply lies in wallets that have not moved for years. According to one data source cited, about 32.4 % of all Bitcoin hasn’t moved in over five years, and about 16.8 % has been dormant for more than a decade.

Why is that relevant? These unmoved coins are often assumed to be “lost”, though not always—some might simply be long‑term holdings or cold wallets. The analyst, James Check of Checkonchain, argues that these coins are the first potential targets in a quantum attack scenario, because many of them use older address formats and signature schemes which might be more exposed.

Threat #2: Cryptography vulnerability

The article identifies that Bitcoin currently uses elliptic‑curve digital signature algorithms (ECDSA) and Schnorr signatures. These rely on locked‑in algorithms that could theoretically be broken by sufficiently powerful quantum computers using, for example, Shor’s algorithm.

It’s noted that the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has already approved several quantum‑resistant signature schemes, and that the Bitcoin community has proposals (such as BIP 360) to adopt post‑quantum cryptography. But moving from proposal to consensus to deployment is non‑trivial in a decentralized network like Bitcoin.

Political/governance risk over purely technical risk

The article argues that the more acute risk isn’t necessarily “quantum hardware tomorrow breaks Bitcoin” but rather the governance and coordination challenge of how to deal with the switch to quantum‑resistant protocols, especially when old coins are involved. If coins migrate to quantum‑resistant addresses, fine. But if a large amount of Bitcoins remain in older address formats, those coins potentially become vulnerable (if quantum attacks arrive).

One quote:

“Actually, I think a lot of confusion on quantum and BTC is that everyone frames it as a tech problem, but what makes the problem specifically unique to BTC is that the tech problem is secondary.”

In short, the article frames this as a “political” / consensus / transition risk more than an immediate technical collapse.

Timeline and technical feasibility

The article provides estimates of how many qubits might be required for an attack. For instance, one estimate suggests that on the order of 126,000 physical qubits might be required to break elliptic‐curve signatures securing Bitcoin wallets. Another posits that 2,300 logical qubits might suffice under certain conditions.

However, not all experts agree the threat is near‑term. For example, Adam Back, CEO of Blockstream, is quoted as saying the quantum threat to Bitcoin is at least 20–40 years away, because today’s machines are noisy and need extensive error correction.

Strategic implications for Bitcoin holders & ecosystem

What does this article mean for someone holding Bitcoin, or for ecosystem watchers? A few key takeaways:

1. If you are holding Bitcoin in long‐term static addresses (especially older address types which expose public keys once redeemed), there is a future risk (though not necessarily immediate) that those coins are more “vulnerable” than ones you migrate to quantum‑safe addresses.
2. The Bitcoin ecosystem will need to coordinate a migration (or upgrade) to quantum‑resistant cryptography, which includes both technical (algorithm selection, wallet implementations) and governance coordination (how to treat old addresses, how to migrate coins, whether to freeze some addresses, etc).
3. There may be “first mover” opportunity or risk around large dormant wallets. If quantum‑capable adversaries begin harvesting public keys from blockchain data now (a “store now, attack later” strategy) then long‑inactive addresses could be tempting targets.
4. The horizon remains uncertain: whether we talk about late 2020s, 2030s, or even 2040s depends on assumptions about quantum hardware progress. But the article makes clear the discussion is increasingly serious among institutional actors. For example, the Government of El Salvador (cited in the article) split its Bitcoin holdings across many addresses explicitly citing quantum risk.

My additional perspective and commentary

From my vantage point the article is valuable, but there are nuances worth emphasizing. First, despite the attention, no known quantum computer today can actually break Bitcoin’s signature scheme in the wild. The estimates of qubit counts are large and assume many breakthroughs in error correction and scaling. So the threat is realistic, but not imminent in the sense of “tomorrow your coins vanish”.

Second, the transition to quantum‑resistant cryptography is easier said than done. In Bitcoin’s case, the network must agree on the changes (via BIPs, deployment, miner/node support) and then wallets/exchanges must roll out support without fracturing the ecosystem. The article correctly frames the governance as the bottleneck.

Third, for holders my advice is conservative: maintain strong security practices, monitor whether your wallet provider or service supports quantum‑resistant schemes (or has migration plans). If you hold coins in cold storage in older address formats and you’re planning to hold for decades, then this topic should at least be on your radar.

Finally, this story intersects with AI: the article mentions that advances in AI‑driven quantum‐algorithm research could accelerate the timeline (for example, discovering more efficient quantum attack algorithms). So it’s not just hardware; software breakthroughs matter.