Proposal targets the transaction mechanism
The proposal, SIMD-0723, would require every Solana transaction to use a recent blockhash. It would also disable System Program instructions used to initialize, advance and upgrade nonce accounts, effectively removing the network feature that allows transactions to remain valid for an extended period.
The Solana Improvement Document was filed on November 5, 2026. The document lists approvals from engineers at Anza and Firedancer as requirements before the change can be merged.
The proposal does not set an immediate shutdown date. Instead, Solana’s migration plan provides roughly six months after a replacement mechanism becomes available. The Foundation’s durable nonce deprecation guidance says the mainnet-beta deactivation target would not arrive before May 5, 2027, and could move later if the replacement is not ready.
That timing reflects the feature’s role in institutional transaction workflows. Custodians, exchanges and other organizations often use air-gapped signing systems, where a transaction is created on one device, approved offline and submitted later. Recent blockhashes can expire before those operational steps are complete. Durable nonces were designed to address that gap.
Removing them would therefore shift the burden from the base transaction format to applications and custody infrastructure. Organizations would need to redesign how approvals are generated, stored and submitted, while ensuring that old approvals cannot be replayed after a security incident or policy change.
Drift attack turned operational risk into protocol issue
The debate intensified after the April 1 exploit at Drift. In its official recovery and relaunch update, Drift described the incident, reported $295 million in outstanding user losses and outlined changes to its signing procedures. The protocol also said it had disabled durable nonces for signers.
The incident connected a feature used for operational convenience with the movement of user funds. Once an attacker obtained misleading approvals from Drift’s security council, pre-signed transactions using durable nonces could remain usable long enough to drain assets. The result was not simply a compromised key or a failed trade. It was a question of how long an authorization should retain economic power after the people who approved it believe the decision has expired.
For exchanges and custodians, that question has a direct capital-allocation consequence. Longer-lived approvals make delayed settlement possible, but they also extend the period during which a stolen or misdirected authorization may be valuable. Shortening that window reduces one category of exposure, while potentially making institutional transaction processing slower or more expensive.
Replacement designs introduce new risks
Solana’s technical discussion is focused on replacing durable nonces rather than simply removing the underlying workflow. The nonce replacement meta-proposal examines the needs of exchanges and custodians that sign transactions offline and considers alternative designs for validating those approvals.
The Foundation lists Anza’s Programmatic Signer and Blueshift’s Vector as possible replacements. These systems would move more of the authorization logic into onchain programs, allowing applications to verify offline signatures without preserving durable nonces as a native transaction feature.
That shift does not eliminate risk. A transaction could fail after an authorization has been accepted, leaving the authorization available unless the system separately revokes it. The security model would therefore change from protecting a long-lived transaction nonce to managing the lifecycle of an onchain authorization.
Solana researcher Max Resnick has argued that a soft-deprecation approach would not adequately solve the underlying problem. In his discussion of soft deprecation, Resnick supported full removal once a suitable replacement is available.
The supplied material contains no opposing statement from developers, exchanges or custodians arguing that durable nonces should remain. That absence does not settle the implementation debate, but it shows where the documented discussion currently stands: the main question is how to migrate safely, not whether the feature’s risks deserve review.
The outcome will test whether Solana’s institutional users can move liquidity through new signing workflows without creating another class of reusable approvals. For the network, the issue is no longer only transaction reliability. It is how much authority a signed instruction should retain over capital after the original intent has gone stale.
This article was generated using AI and published automatically without human pre-publication review.
Read and checked by admin on 11/10/2026
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