CoinDesk reported that Judge Jessica Clarke entered a judgment of acquittal on November 16, 2026, ending the prosecution after a jury deadlocked and a mistrial was declared in November 2025. The case concerned a trading operation that allegedly extracted approximately $25 million in about 12 seconds by exploiting transaction-ordering systems used by Ethereum validators.
The ruling tests the boundary between conduct that may violate the expectations of a financial protocol and conduct that can be prosecuted as fraud under existing U.S. law. It also raises questions for relay operators, validator infrastructure providers, automated trading firms and developers of permissionless financial networks.
A rapid attack on sandwich bots
The Justice Department alleged that the brothers engineered a transaction sequence designed to attract automated trading bots. These bots typically perform “sandwich” trades by placing transactions immediately before and after a targeted transaction, seeking to profit from the resulting price movement.
According to the government’s account, the brothers submitted eight transactions intended to lure those bots. When a relay presented their validator with a proposed block containing the bots’ trades, the brothers obtained information about the transactions and constructed a replacement block. The replacement retained the bots’ purchases but substituted transactions that sold into them, causing the automated traders to lose approximately $25 million.
The alleged operation depended on a weakness in software used to deliver proposed Ethereum blocks to validators. A relay accepted a validator signature containing invalid fields that had been set to zero. Because the relay did not properly validate those fields, it exposed the contents of the proposed block before the block had been finalized and published.
The brothers’ validator was penalized by approximately one ether, according to the government’s description of the incident. The much larger economic loss was borne by the automated traders whose transactions were incorporated into the proposed block and then exploited.
The Justice Department characterized the conduct as an attack on Ethereum and charged the brothers with wire fraud and related offenses. The acquittal, however, means the government did not secure a criminal conviction for the alleged exploit.
The court’s focus was misrepresentation
In its opinion and order, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the prosecution had not established the required material misrepresentation. The ruling examined two central issues: whether the brothers misrepresented their intentions through transactions placed in Ethereum’s public mempool, and whether the invalid signature fields materially affected the relay’s conduct.
The court concluded that pending transactions in the mempool did not amount to a promise that they would be bundled or executed in any particular way. In a permissionless blockchain system, transactions are visible to participants and may be reordered, replaced or excluded according to the rules and incentives governing block production. The judge therefore rejected the premise that submitting transactions created an enforceable representation about how those transactions would later be used.
The court also found that the falsified signature fields did not influence the relay’s behavior. Because the relay failed to validate the fields, the court reasoned that the data did not cause the relay to perform an action it otherwise would have refused to perform. That distinction was decisive for the wire fraud analysis.
The opinion described Ethereum as a “trustless, highly adversarial environment with no terms of use.” The phrase does not mean that every action on the network is lawful or consistent with its intended operation. Instead, it reflects the court’s conclusion that prosecutors could not identify a specific promise or obligation that had been materially misrepresented in the alleged attack.
Technical failure and legal limits
A contemporaneous postmortem by Flashbots and the Ultrasound Relay team described the underlying incident as involving an attacker who submitted an invalid block header, obtained access to block contents and drained sandwich bots. The teams said the event prompted emergency patches to relay software and highlighted the risks created when signed block metadata is not fully checked before transaction contents are revealed.
The technical account supports the basic mechanism described in the criminal case, but it does not establish criminal liability. That separation is central to the ruling. A relay can be poorly designed, and a trader can exploit that weakness, without the conduct necessarily satisfying the elements of wire fraud.
The ruling also leaves open broader questions about how other criminal statutes might apply to similar activity. A different case could involve unauthorized access, manipulation of a platform, theft theories or explicit contractual representations. The acquittal does not create a general legal authorization for transaction manipulation, but it shows that prosecutors must connect the conduct to a provable false statement or deceptive act covered by the charged statute.
Implications for infrastructure providers
The decision is likely to increase pressure on relay operators and validator infrastructure providers to validate signed metadata before releasing sensitive transaction information. If a relay reveals a block’s contents after accepting malformed authorization data, automated traders and other participants may be exposed to attacks that occur before a block reaches the chain.
Asymmetric Research argued in its analysis that inadequate validation can allow proposers to reveal and reorder transactions assembled by builders. That analysis was critical of relay designs that rely on incomplete checks, although it addressed a related vulnerability rather than determining the legal issues in the Peraire-Bueno case.
The sources reviewed for this article include the government’s allegations, the court’s ruling and technical accounts from infrastructure teams. They do not include a separate public response from the brothers beyond the positions addressed in the court proceedings.
For trading firms, the case illustrates the difficulty of relying on criminal law to protect strategies built around transaction ordering. For developers, it underscores the need to treat signed metadata as security-critical rather than administrative data. For regulators and prosecutors, it highlights a widening gap between economic abuse, violations of protocol norms and conduct that can be proven as fraud under existing statutes.
That gap is likely to become more significant as decentralized exchanges, automated agents and validator services expand across jurisdictions. The acquittal does not resolve how those systems should be governed. It does establish that, in this case, the government could not turn an exploit of Ethereum’s adversarial design into a wire fraud conviction.
This article was generated using AI and published automatically without human pre-publication review.
Read and checked by admin on 11/18/2026
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