A practical quantum computer capable of defeating widely used financial encryption does not yet exist. However, the window for preparation may be much shorter than the technology’s current limitations suggest. The International Organization of Securities Commissions said firms should begin planning a multiyear migration to post-quantum cryptography now, rather than wait for a definitive timetable.

The warning is especially significant for crypto markets, where control of assets depends on digital signatures rather than a central institution that can reverse unauthorized transfers. Bitcoin, Ethereum and other blockchain networks use cryptographic signatures to prove ownership and authorize transactions. If quantum hardware becomes powerful enough to derive private keys from exposed public keys, funds in vulnerable addresses could become targets.

CoinDesk reported on IOSCO’s warning that industry expectations put the arrival of such systems within roughly five years, although the timing remains uncertain.

The migration problem

In its 63-page report on quantum computing and financial markets, IOSCO said no known quantum computer can currently break the cryptographic systems used across financial markets. Its concern is that replacing those systems will take years because institutions must identify vulnerable technology, test alternatives and migrate without interrupting services.

For blockchains, the challenge extends beyond updating software. Users must move assets into addresses supported by quantum-resistant signatures, while networks must maintain compatibility during the transition. Exchanges, custodians, wallet providers and decentralized applications would all need to coordinate their upgrades.

The risk also concerns assets that are not actively traded. Coins held in older wallets could remain vulnerable if their owners fail to migrate them, lose access to their keys or die without leaving instructions. In some cases, the owner may be unable to sign a transfer to a safer address. That creates a question with no easy technical answer: should apparently exposed or permanently dormant coins eventually be frozen?

Freezing those balances could reduce the funds available to a future attacker. It could also conflict with crypto’s central principle that control belongs to the holder of the private key, not to a company, regulator or developer group. Any decision to invalidate old signatures or restrict vulnerable addresses could become a governance dispute with direct consequences for the distribution of wealth on a network.

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Post-quantum signature size increases cited in the article

Security versus capacity

The strongest argument against rapid migration is not that quantum threats are imaginary. It is that post-quantum protections may impose an immediate economic cost long before a quantum attack becomes possible.

IOSCO said quantum-resistant signatures can be substantially larger than the signatures used today. The report discusses potential increases of 35 to 40 times, which could raise transaction fees, increase storage requirements and reduce the number of transactions that fit into a block.

Those costs matter because blockchain security is tied to the ability to process transactions at a predictable price. If each transaction becomes much larger, users may compete for less available block space. Exchanges and custodians could face higher operational expenses, while smaller participants could be pushed toward centralized intermediaries that batch transactions or absorb the cost.

A test cited by CoinDesk illustrated the tradeoff. In an article on Solana’s quantum readiness, Project Eleven CEO Alex Pruden said a Solana test environment using quantum-resistant signatures ran about 90% slower, while the signatures were roughly 20 to 40 times larger than current versions.

That result does not mean Solana, Bitcoin or Ethereum would necessarily suffer the same performance reduction in production. It does show why migration is not a routine wallet update. A network that adopts stronger signatures must decide who bears the cost: users through higher fees, validators through greater hardware requirements, or token holders through lower capacity and slower settlement.

The Solana Foundation has argued that the network needs compact post-quantum signatures suitable for high-throughput blockchains. In its quantum-readiness update, the foundation described work by Anza and Firedancer aimed at improving resilience while preserving the performance characteristics on which Solana’s activity depends.

The cost of waiting

Regulators are urging firms to prepare before the threat becomes measurable in real-world attacks. The Bank of England, Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority said in their guidance on quantum-related cyber risk that institutions should inventory cryptographic dependencies, identify vulnerable systems and third-party providers, and create migration plans that can adapt as standards and hardware develop.

IOSCO describes the tendency to delay those decisions as “quantum-procrastination.” Institutions may recognize the threat but postpone spending because the deadline is uncertain, standards are still developing and current systems remain secure.

For crypto networks, waiting could concentrate risk in legacy addresses and unmaintained infrastructure. Moving early, however, could divert capital toward upgrades that reduce throughput and increase transaction costs for a threat that may remain years away.

The financial question is therefore not simply whether quantum computers will eventually break existing cryptography. It is whether networks can preserve the value and liquidity stored on them while replacing the technology that authorizes ownership. Banks may be able to impose common standards across their systems. Public blockchains must persuade millions of users, independent developers and competing economic actors to migrate voluntarily.

That makes quantum readiness a test of governance as much as engineering. The networks that manage the transition successfully may protect both their security and their economic usefulness. Those that delay could leave capital trapped in vulnerable addresses. Those that move too aggressively could make ordinary transactions more expensive and less accessible before the threat has fully arrived.

#IOSCO#Bitcoin#Ethereum#Solana#Bank of England#Prudential Regulation Authority#Alex Pruden
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Read and checked by admin on 11/20/2026

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